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 
Abstract— the well-known range-Doppler coupling property of 
the LFM (Linear Frequency Modulation) pulse compression 
radar makes it more vulnerable to repeater jammer that shifts 
radar signal in the frequency domain before retransmitting it 
back to the radar. The repeater jammer, in this case, benefits 
from the pulse compression processing gain of the radar receiver, 
and generates many false targets that appear before and after the 
true target. Therefore, the radar cannot distinguish between the 
true target and the false ones. 
In this paper, we present a new technique to counter frequency 
shifting repeater jammers. The proposed technique is based on 
introducing a small change in the sweep bandwidth of LFM 
waveform. The effectiveness of the proposed technique is justified 
by mathematical analysis and demonstrated by simulation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
EVERAL waveforms were used in pulse compression 
radar. However, the LFM (Linear Frequency Modulation) 
waveform is the most commonly used one, in both search and 
track radars, due to its high Doppler tolerance. However, the 
range-Doppler coupling property of LFM waveform makes 
radar more vulnerable to repeater jammer that shifts radar 
signal in frequency and instantly retransmitting it back to the 
victim radar. Since the jammer signal, in this case, looks like 
the radar return, it benefits from the pulse compression 
processing gain of the radar receiver and produces at its output 
false targets that appear before and after the true target. In this 
way, the radar cannot discriminate the true target [1-2].  
The common ECCM (Electronic counter-countermeasures) 
techniques are effective against some types of jammers. 
However, these techniques have some drawbacks that make 
them unsuitable to counter frequency-shifting jammer. The 
coherence check technique compares between the pulse rising 
time and the detected target (after matched filter) range 
position in order to discriminate the true target. Of course, this 
is applicable only at a certain SNR (signal to noise ratio) of the 
incoming jamming pulse [3]. The pulse-width discriminator 
technique measures the width of each received pulse, again 
 
 
S. Baher Safa Hanbali is with the Higher Institute of Applied Sciences and 
Technology, Damascus, Syria (e-mail: Samer.Hanbali@hiast.edu.sy). 
R. Kastantin is with the Higher Institute of Applied Sciences and 
Technology, Damascus, Syria (e-mail: Radwan.Kastantin@hiast.edu.sy).  
 
this is applicable only at a certain SNR [3], if the received 
pulse is not of approximately the same width as the transmitted 
pulse, and it is rejected. However, this technique cannot help in 
rejecting frequency-shifting jammers because the jamming 
pulses have the same width of the radar-transmitted pulse. 
Pulse-to-pulse PRI (Pulse repetition interval) jitter technique 
identifies the false targets returns if the deception jammer uses 
a delay that is greater than a PRI period to generate false 
targets return [4], but this technique is inefficient in the case of 
instantaneously retransmitting the radar pulse after shifting it 
in frequency. The frequency agility technique changes the 
radio frequency of radar to make it impossible to know what 
the radio frequency of the next pulse will be, but if the jammer 
has a DIFM (Digital Instantaneous Frequency Measurement 
Receiver) that measures approximately the first 50 ns of a 
pulse, it can quickly set to that radio frequency. Because 
modern radars typically have pulses of several microseconds 
long [4]. Orthogonal waveforms technique transmits 
successive orthogonal waveforms that have low cross-
correlation [5-6], when jammer pulse lags behind the true 
target pulse, it will not benefit from the pulse compression 
gain, but this situation is not applicable in the case of 
instantaneous frequency-shifting jammer.  
To overcome the limitations of the mentioned ECCM 
techniques that are only effective under a high SNR or when 
jamming pulses lag behind the true target echo, we propose 
countering the frequency-shifting jammer by small changing 
the sweep bandwidth of the LFM waveform so that the time-
bandwidth product (pulse compression gain) of LFM 
waveform is unaffected. In this case, the radar transmits M 
pulses of the normal sweep bandwidth and M pulses of smaller 
sweep bandwidth alternately. True that the false target echo 
will gain from the integration process in both cases at the 
detector, but it will appear now in two adjacent range bins, 
whereas the true target will remain in the same range bin, and 
thus it can be discriminated. 
The paper is organized as follows. The LFM pulse 
compression radar is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, 
mathematical representation of the frequency-shifting jamming 
at the output of the matched filter is presented. In Section 4, a 
new technique to counter frequency-shifting repeater jammer 
is proposed. Finally, simulation results are demonstrated in 
section 5. 
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II. LFM PULSE COMPRESSION RADAR  
The complex envelope 𝑥(𝑡) of a LFM waveform, that has a 












where 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 is the rectangular function, and  𝑘 = 𝐵 𝑇⁄  is LFM 
modulation slope. 
The ambiguity function diagram of the LFM waveform 
exhibits range-Doppler coupling property. Thus, the output of 
the matched filter remains approximately constant for Doppler 
shift up to 𝐵/10 [4]. However, this property makes radar 
vulnerable to repeater jammer that shifts radar signal in the 
frequency domain [1-2].  
The output of the matched filter due to LFM waveform when 
𝐵𝑇 ≫ 1 can be written as [1] 
 
 |𝑦(𝑡)| =  √𝐵𝑇 . 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐(𝜋𝐵𝑡) (2) 
The pulse compression gain of the matched filter equals to: 
 
 𝐺 = 10𝑙𝑜𝑔10(𝐵𝑇) (3) 
III. JAMMING LFM PULSE COMPRESSION RADAR 
Active jamming is the process of transmitting undesired sig-
nals towards victim radar with the objective of degrading its 
ability to detect the targets or to make it obtains wrong 
information of them. Mainly the jammers can be classified as a 
cover jammer and deceptive jammer [8]. In the former, the 
jammer transmits interference signals (usually noise) in order 
to prevent victim radars from detecting friendly targets. While 
in the second, the jammer transmits interference signals similar 
to the radar returns that processed by the victim radar receiver 
as a valid return signal, in order to prevent the radar from 
obtaining the correct range, velocity and/or angle information 
of the targets [8]. 
According to the jamming topology, we can distinguish 
between self-protection and stand-off jammers. In self-
protection topology, the jammer is carried by the same vehicle 
or airplane to be protected from detection or tracking by a 
hostile radar. While, in stand-off jammers, the target is 
protected by a jammer carried by other friendly platform 
(vehicle or airplane) or located at some distance far from the 
victim radar [8].  
Cover jamming masks the targets by continuous transmission 
of high power noise signal concentrated around the operational 
radar frequency. However, most of practical radar periodically 
changes its RF frequency. Thus, the jammer has to measure the 
radar RF frequency in order to be effective. The effectiveness 
of such jammers is usually measured by Jamming-to-Signal 
Ratio (JSR). The victim radar can usually mitigate the 
effectiveness of this type of jammer by reducing the radar 
antenna sidelobe, either by reshaping the antenna pattern or by 
using sidelobe canceller (SLC) circuit [3]. When countering 
LFM radar by transmitting noise signal, the jammer does not 
benefit from the gain of the matched filter. Therefore, the 
jammer has to increase its power in order to disable the radar 
capability, which is not always realizable especially for 
airborne jammer. On the other hand, increasing the jammer 
power make it more vulnerable to be destroyed by anti-
radiation missile.  
Different deceptive jammer techniques were proposed, in the 
literature, in order to jam LFM-PC (LFM pulse compression) 
radar more effectively by using low power signal. These 
techniques benefit from the range-Doppler coupling properties 
of LFM waveform. The aim of these techniques is to distort 
the output of radar matched filter and to generate false targets 
at its output. Actually, this can be achieved by transmitting 
modified version of the radar signal, so the jammer partially 
benefits from the processing gain of the matched filter [1-2]. 
These techniques can be used simultaneously to jam search 
and track radars. Generating false targets at the detector output, 
in search radar, prevents it from the identification of the true 
target and overload its processing unit. While, in track radar, 
these false targets can degrade its range tracker performance 
[3]. 
Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) repeater jammer 
is example of deceptive jammer that has been widely used in 
Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) systems. In DRFM, the 
jammer stores radar pulses digitally in a memory after down-
conversion. Then the stored samples may be amplitude-, 
frequency- or phase-modulated. The resulting samples are 
converted back to analog signal and up-converted and 
retransmitted back in synchronization with next received radar 
pulse toward the victim radar [9]. Since the jammer retransmits 
pulses lag behind the radar pulses so it can be recognized by 
radar system easily [9]. The limitations of DRFM jammer can 
be overcome by instantaneously retransmitting the radar pulse 
after shifting it in frequency [1]. Thus, many false targets are 
generated at the output of matched filter. The aim of this work 
is to counter this type of repeater jammer that has one or more 
of the following modulations:   
• One Frequency-shifting. 
• Multiple Frequency shifting 
A. ONE FREQUENCY-SHIFTING JAMMING 
Repeater jammer can generate a false target at the output of 
LFM radar detector simply by frequency shifting the radar 
signal. The amount of the frequency shift determines the 
relative distance between the true target and the false one. In 
this case, the jamming signal equals [1]: 
 
 𝑥𝐽(𝑡) = 𝑥(𝑡) ∙ 𝑒
𝑗2𝜋𝑓𝐽𝑡  (4) 
where 𝑓𝐽 is the frequency shift of the jammer, and 𝑥(𝑡) is the 
radar signal that is given in eq. 1. When 𝑓𝑗 < 𝐵 the output of 
the matched filter, due to jamming signal, can be approximate 
by [1]: 
 The false target leads the true target when (𝑓𝐽 > 0) as shown 
in Fig. 1, and lags behind it when (𝑓𝐽 < 0). The relative 
distance between the true target and the false one equals [1]: 
 
 𝑑 = 𝑐𝑓𝑗 2𝑘⁄   (6) 
where 𝑐 is the speed of light.  
|𝑦(𝑡)| ≈ √𝐵𝑇 |1 −
𝑓𝐽
𝐵
| . 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐 [𝜋(𝐵 − 𝑓𝐽) (𝑡 +
𝑓𝐽
𝑘
) ]          (5) 
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The amplitude of the false target is slightly lower than the 
amplitude of the true one by the value |1 − 𝑓𝐽 𝐵⁄ |. Therefore, 
the jammer has to increase its power in order to compensate 
for this loss.  
 
Fig.1 The matched filter output in case of one frequency-shifting jamming. 
B. MULTIPLE FREQUENCY-SHIFTING JAMMING 
Many false targets can be generated simultaneously at the 
output of matched filter if the repeater jammer modulates the 
radar signal by a periodic square train that has amplitude ±1 . 
The periodic square train which has amplitude ±1 and 










where 𝑛 = ±1, ±3, … In this case, the jamming signal can be 
written as: 
 𝑥𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑚(𝑡) ∙ 𝑥(𝑡)  (8) 
where 𝑥(𝑡) the radar signal that is given in eq.1. From the 
multiplication property of Fourier transform, the frequency 
spectrum of jamming signal is given by: 
 





𝛿(𝑓 − 𝑛𝑓𝑚) 
(9) 
Which can finally be written as: 
 





𝑋(𝑓 − 𝑛𝑓𝑚) 
(10) 
The last equation shows that the modulation of radar signal by 
a periodic square train is equivalent to frequency shift of radar 
signal by the odd-harmonics of periodic square train. The 
spectrum of the output of the matched filter, in this case, can 
be written as: 







𝑋(𝑓 − 𝑛𝑓𝑚)] . 𝐻(𝑓) 
(11) 
Using the ambiguity function, it can be shown that the output 
of the matched filter due to jammer signal is given as: 
 






where 𝑎𝑛 = 2 𝑗𝜋𝑛⁄ , and 𝑢𝑛(𝑡) is given by: 






Based on (12) and (13), it is clear that the output of the 
matched filter consists of many false target {𝑢𝑛(𝑡)}, each with 
a frequency shift 𝑛𝑓𝑚 and a scale factor of 𝑎𝑛 as seen by the 
matched filter. 
The number of false targets, 𝑁𝑓, that lead or lag the true 
target determined by maximum value of 𝑛 satisfies: 
 𝑓𝑚×(2𝑛 − 1) ≤ 2𝐵 (14) 
which implies,  
 
𝑁𝑓 = ⌊




where ⌊𝑥⌋denotes the nearest integer less or equal 𝑥. 
Fig.2 shows the false targets at the output of matched filter 
when radar signal is modulated by a periodic square train. This 
figure shows that the farther the false target from the true 
target, the lower its power. In effect, equation (12) shows that 
the amplitude of the harmonics of periodic square train 
decrease with 𝑛. Thus, jammer has to increase its power. 
 
Fig.2 The output of the matched filter when LFM radar signal modulated by 
a periodic square train 
We can generalize equation (8) by using an appropriate 
modulating signal 𝑚(𝑡). For example, if we multiply radar 
signal by sawtooth signal, instead of periodic square train, we 
can duplicate the number of false targets and make them closer 
to each other, as shown in Fig .3, because the sawtooth signal 
contains odd and even harmonics. 
 
Fig.3 The output of the matched filter when LFM radar signal modulated by 
a periodic sawtooth signal 
True Target d 
True Target 
True Target 
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IV. COUNTERING FREQUENCY SHIFTING REPEATER JAMMERS 
In the previous section, we presented frequency shifting 
repeater jammers that benefit from the Doppler-range coupling 
property of LFM signal to generate false targets at the output 
of the matched filter.  
The distribution of these false targets is a function of the 
jammer parameters and the sweep bandwidth of the LFM 
waveform. Since this type of repeater jammer does not analyse 
the radar signal, the radar can counter this jamming and detect 
the true target by changing the sweep bandwidth (B) of the 
transmitted LFM waveform. The matched filter is always 
matched to the transmitted pulse, i.e., the matched filter is 
altered as the sweep bandwidth of the signal is changed. By 
changing 𝐵, the SNR of the received signal does not change 
whereas the range resolution does [10].  
When the radar changes the sweep bandwidth of the LFM 
waveform, the relative distances (d) between the true target 
and the false ones will change. Consequently, false targets 
appear in different range bins, but the true target remains 
nearly in the same range bin, because the jammer frequency 
shift is much bigger than Doppler shift of the true target. 
We suppose, for simplicity, that the jammer shifts the LFM 
waveform by a single frequency 𝑓𝐽. This introduces one false 
target, at the output of the matched filter, spaced from the true 
target by 𝑐𝑓𝑗 2𝑘⁄  . 
According to eq. 6, if the radar increases the LFM sweep 
bandwidth, the false target will be closer to the true one, and it 
may overlap on it and may be confused with it. Furthermore, 
this will impose more complexity on the radar receiver. To get 
rid of these problems, the radar can decrease the sweep 
bandwidth instead of increasing it. However, this will decrease 






The appropriate value of the new sweep bandwidth 𝛽 that 
makes the false target to be in a different range bin (one radar 
range resolution) can be calculated as follows. Let’s 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 
denote the relative distance between the true target and the 
false one at sweep bandwidth B and 𝛽 respectively then we 
need that: 
 𝑑2 = 𝑑1 + ∆𝑅 (17) 
















When the false target is far from the true target, which is the 
case the jammer usually aims, a small decrease in radar 
bandwidth is required. However, when the false target is 
relatively close to the true target, a higher decrease in radar 
bandwidth is required as illustrated in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig.4 The required decrease in the sweep bandwidth vs. jammer frequency 
shift relative to sweep bandwidth 
As shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, the radar range resolution and 
the matched filter gain will not degrade too much. Therefore, 
the proposed countering technique will not degrade radar 
performance significantly. In Fig. 5, ∆𝑅𝐵 and ∆𝑅𝛽 denote the 
radar range resolution at sweep bandwidth B and 𝛽 
respectively. And in Fig. 6, 𝐺𝐵 and 𝐺𝛽 denote the matched 
filter gain at sweep bandwidth B and 𝛽 respectively.  
Of course the jammer frequency shift is unknown for the 
radar, so the anti-jamming calculation for the new sweep 
bandwidth can be considered for the worst case when 𝑓𝑗 is very 
small. According to Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig .6 this means the 
required decrease in 𝐵 is about 5% and the degradation of ∆𝑅 
and 𝐺 is 5% and 0.8% respectively, and this could be 
practically acceptable. 
 
Fig.5 The degradation of radar range resolution vs. jammer frequency shift 
relative to sweep bandwidth.  
 
Fig.6 The degradation of matched filter gain vs. jammer frequency shift 
relative to sweep bandwidth. 
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Now, we show the effect of changing 𝐵 by about 5% on the 
apparent range of the true target. The range offset of the true 
























 ∆𝑅𝑜𝑓 = 0.05𝑓𝑑𝑇 ∙ ∆𝑅  (23) 
Practically we have 0.05𝑓𝑑𝑇 < 1, then ∆𝑅𝑜𝑓 < ∆𝑅 so the 
apparent range of true target displaced by a fraction of ∆𝑅 and 
can be considered in the same range bin. 
Figure 7 shows the block-diagram of the proposed anti-
jamming technique which is very similar to the standard radar 
structure except there is a multiplexer to switch between the 
two transmitted signals 𝑥1(𝑡), 𝑥2(𝑡). Where 𝑥1(𝑡) is the radar 
signal, 𝑥2(𝑡) is the anti-jamming radar signal that has a sweep 
bandwidth equals 𝛽, 𝑟(𝑡) is the received signal, and 𝑥𝑇(𝑡) is 

















































Fig.8 comparison memory  (a) transmission of x1(t)                      
(b)transmission of x2(t) 
 
Alternately, the radar transmits M pulses of 𝑥1(𝑡) and M 
pulses of 𝑥2(𝑡). The detected targets in both cases are stored in 
different memory locations as shown in Fig.8, where T and F 
denote true target and false ones, respectively. By comparing 
the detection results, the true target remains in the same range 
bin, but the false target appears in the adjacent range bin. 
V. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
In the following, we present Matlab simulation results of our 
proposed approach presented in section 4. We assume 𝑇 =
100 𝜇𝑠, 𝐵 =  5 𝑀𝐻𝑧, ∆𝑅 = 30 𝑚 and 𝑓𝑗 = 200 𝐾𝐻𝑧. The 
Fig. 9 (solid curve) shows the output of the radar receiver 
when 𝐵 =  5 𝑀𝐻𝑧. It can be seen that the false target leads the 
true target by 𝑑1 = 600𝑚 which is consistent with the eq. 6. 
The same figure (dotted curve) shows the same results when 
𝛽 =  4.76 𝑀𝐻𝑧 as eq. 19. It is clear that the true target remains 
in the same range bin but the false target appears in another 
range bin. The new relative distance between the true target 
and false one becomes  𝑑2 = 630𝑚  (see eq. 18). 
Consequently, the true target can be discriminated easily. 
 
 
Fig.9 The output of the radar receiver when 𝐵 =  5𝑀𝐻𝑧 (solid curve) and 𝛽 =
 4.76𝑀𝐻𝑧 (dotted curve) 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed a new technique to counter 
frequency shifting repeater jammers against LFM radar. The 
proposed technique is based on introducing a slight change in 
the sweep bandwidth of the radar signal. By doing that, the 
true target at the radar detector output will remain in the same 
range bin, whereas the false target will appear in other 
different range bins. Consequently, the true target can be 
discriminated easily. The simulation results show that the 
proposed method suffers a slight degradation compared with 
case where there is no modification nor jamming, as the 
mathematical analysis has shown. The proposed technique is 
better than other ECCM techniques that require a high SNR or 
assume that jamming pulses lag behind the true target echo 
that is not true in the case of instantly retransmitting the radar 
pulse after frequency-shifting.  
True Target False Target 
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